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Governance Transfer by Regional Organizations. Following a Global Script?
Tanja A. Börzel, Vera van Hüllen, and Mathis Lohaus
Abstract
Since the end of the Cold War, international organizations and states have developed pro-
grams to promote (good) governance at the country level. Regional organizations have gained 
an important role in governance transfer because they constitute an intermediary level of 
agency between the nation-state and global institutions. This paper maps the governance 
transfer of nine regional organizations in the Americas, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. We 
analyze the objectives, approaches, and instruments used to promote the creation and trans-
formation of governance institutions in target countries. This comparison shows that similar 
standards and instruments have been adopted throughout the areas of study, in line with the 
notion of a global governance script.  At the same time, we find important differences with 
regard to when and how the regional organizations prescribe and promote “good” gover-
nance institutions at the national level. Research on diffusion and comparative regionalism is 
ill-equipped to account for this double finding of increasing similarities and persisting differ-
ences. The paper calls for a more agency-centered approach that conceptualizes governance 
transfer as an institutional choice by states. We identify factors that elicit states’ demand for 
governance transfer, on the one hand, and that shape its institutional design, on the other.
Zusammenfassung
Seit Ende des Kalten Krieges haben Internationale Organisationen und Staaten Programme 
entwickelt, um „Gutes Regieren“ in Mitgliedstaaten und Drittländern zu fördern. Regional-
organisationen sind als Vermittler zwischen nationalen und globalen Institutionen wichtig für 
solche Governance-Transfers. Dieses Papier erfasst den Governance-Transfer von neun Re-
gionalorganisationen in den Amerikas, Afrika, Asien und im Nahen Osten. Dabei analysieren 
wir die Ziele, Ansätze und Instrumente für die Schaffung oder Veränderung von Institutionen 
in Zielländern. Dieser Vergleich zeigt Ähnlichkeiten bei Standards und Instrumenten, was auf 
die Ausbreitung eines „globalen Skripts“ für Governance hindeutet. Allerdings unterscheiden 
sich Organisationen auch darin, wie und wann sie bestimmte Governance-Institutionen in 
Mitgliedstaaten vorschreiben und fördern. Die Diffusions- und Vergleichende Regionalis-
musforschung ist auf einen solchen Doppelbefund schlecht vorbereitet. Unser Papier schlägt 
einen stärker auf Akteure fokussierten Ansatz vor, der Governance-Transfer als Konsequenz 
staatlicher Entscheidungen ansieht. Wir identifizieren Faktoren, die einerseits die Nachfrage 
nach solchen Prozessen und andererseits ihre institutionelle Ausgestaltung beeinflussen.
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1. Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, international organizations and states have developed pro-
grams to promote (good) governance in member states and third countries. Development co-
operation, for instance, has become a primary tool not only for providing goods and services 
in target countries, but also for transferring governance institutions, such as the rule of law or 
democracy. Regional organizations (ROs) have gained an important role in governance trans-
fer. They constitute an intermediate level of agency between the nation-state and global in-
stitutions. Their broad mandate allows them to promote legitimate governance institutions 
in their member states and, in some cases, also third countries. Today, almost every regional 
organization prescribes and promotes some standards for governance at the national level, ir-
respective of its original purpose – including simple free-trade agreements. In doing so, they 
not only foster the evolution of regional order, but also induce the transformation of national 
order.
This paper provides an overview of the transfer of governance institutions by regional organi-
zations in and to areas of limited statehood. It presents findings on the objectives, approaches, 
and instruments of nine regional organizations in Africa, the Americas, Asia, and the Middle 
East: the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and 
Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Organization of American States 
(OAS), North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Common Market of the South (Mercado 
Común del Sur, Mercosur), and Andean Community (Comunidad Andina de Naciones, CAN); 
the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN); and the League of Arab States (LAS). 
The nine ROs vary with regard to their institutional design (breadth and depth of regional co-
operation) as well as with regard to the degree of statehood and the regime type of their mem-
ber states. The comparison of major regional organizations as diverse as NAFTA, ECOWAS, 
and ASEAN enables us to evaluate the extent to which we can observe the diffusion of a global 
governance script. We argue that there is an expansion of “good” governance-related regional 
provisions across time and space. Regional organizations have developed more detailed pre-
scriptions of standards for human rights, the rule of law, the fight against corruption, and 
increasingly also democracy. They have also established similar instruments to promote these 
standards for “good” governance, including the legal protection of human rights, “democracy 
clauses,” membership conditionality, election observation missions, and election assistance. 
Despite these common institutional trends, we find systematic differences between the gov-
ernance transfers of ROs. If they follow a “global script,” its adoption is “localized” (Acharya 
2004). ROs choose from a menu of standards and instruments rather than simply “download-
ing” the whole package. Research on diffusion and comparative regionalism is ill-equipped to 
account for this double finding of increasing similarities and persisting differences. We call 
for a more agency-centered approach that conceptualizes governance transfer as an institu-
tional choice by states. We identify factors that elicit states’ demand for governance transfer, 
on the one hand, and that shape its institutional design, on the other.
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The paper proceeds in four steps. First, we introduce an analytical framework that allows us 
to map the governance transfer of regional organizations. Second, using this framework, we 
compare the standards for legitimate governance that our nine ROs promote and the instru-
ments they employ. The empirical analysis draws on case study reports by regional experts.1 
For reasons of scope, we cannot give a full account of their findings here. Rather, we seek to 
identify broad similarities and differences in the governance transfer that the various ROs en-
gage in, focusing on their standards and instruments. Third, we summarize the main findings 
and discuss to what extent regional organizations prescribe and promote similar criteria for 
“good” governance institutions, or whether regional and local particularities prevail. Fourth, 
we highlight how the double finding of increasing similarities and persisting differences in 
governance transfer by regional organizations challenges research on both the diffusion of a 
global script and the particularities of world regions. We propose taking a more agency-based 
approach that focuses on the demand and supply of governance transfer.
2. Governance transfer: Concepts and analytical tools
We refer to governance transfer when regional organizations explicitly prescribe and/or in-
tentionally and actively promote the creation and modification of governance institutions in 
member states or third countries. In line with the SFB 700, we understand governance insti-
tutions as norms, rules, and procedures that are the basis for the provision of collective goods 
and collectively binding rules (what), defining the who (governance actors: state and non-state), 
how (modes of social coordination: hierarchical and non-hierarchical), and for whom (gover-
nance collective) of governance (Beisheim et al. 2011). 
Figure 1: Governance transfer by regional organizations
1 This paper draws heavily on case study reports prepared in the project B2, “Exporting (Good) Gover-
nance: Regional Organizations and Areas of Limited Statehood” at the Collaborative Research Center 
(SFB) 700 “Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood,” Freie Universität Berlin. In particular, we would 
like to thank our regional experts, Francesco Duina, Christof Hartmann, Anja Jetschke, Julia Leini-
nger, Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann, Osvaldo Saldías, as well as Anna van der Vleuten and Merran Hulse, 
for their great cooperation and conceptual and empirical input into the project. We would also like 
to thank Heba Ahmed, Carina Breschke, Corinna Krome, and Kai Striebinger for their most valuable 
research assistance and other support to our joint project. Finally, we are grateful to Diana Panke, 
Steve Krasner, Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Thomas Risse, Ursula Schröder, Daniel Berliner, and the 
participants of the SFB 700’s weekly seminar as well as of the Jour Fixe of the KFG “The Transformative 
Power of Europe” for their helpful comments and criticisms.
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We are interested in macro-level institutions, referring to the organization of rule/authority 
more broadly, the way it is reflected in a country’s political system. In this, the state is certainly 
a major point of reference, providing the overall (constitutional) framework for governance. 
However, state actors are not necessarily the only governance actors, as non-state actors can 
be involved in governance as well, for example through public-private partnerships or in the 
form of private self-regulation (Beisheim et al. 2011). While focusing on the political system, 
we are also interested in norms, rules, and procedures delimiting the political from the eco-
nomic and social spheres, basically defining state-market and state-society relations. 
By prescribing and promoting standards for governance institutions, the regional organiza-
tion defines what governance should look like at the national level if it is to be legitimate. We 
therefore clearly focus on the normative dimension of legitimacy and not on the actual belief 
in legitimacy. We expect that standards for legitimate governance institutions mainly draw 
on different notions of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance. How-
ever, it is an empirical question which criteria for legitimacy regional organizations establish. 
When regional organizations are transferring governance institutions, this does not imply 
that they are themselves governance actors at the national level, directly involved in the adop-
tion and implementation of collectively binding rules and/or the provision of collective goods. 
Rather, regional organizations try to influence governance institutions at the national level, 
targeting their member states or third countries.
Figure 2:  Categories and dimensions of governance transfer by regional organizations
Categories
Dimensions
Regional 
organization
Domestic 
actors
Standards Mechanisms Case studies
Prescription Standard-
setter
Addressee Content -/-
Framework
Pr
om
ot
io
n
Policy
Promoter Target Objective Instrument
Formal adoption of 
measures
Measures
Practical applica-
tion of measures
In investigating the framework for governance transfer by regional organizations, we consider 
both the prescription of standards and the provisions for their active promotion and protec-
tion. Provisions for governance transfer can be integrated into the founding treaties of a re-
gional organization, political declarations by its member states, or secondary legislation at the 
regional level. In addition, we analyze the adoption and implementation of actual measures 
by regional actors, examining the application of instruments and other, ad-hoc initiatives. We 
describe governance transfer in terms of the actors involved (standard-setter vs. addressee; 
promoter vs. target), the standards set and promoted (content; objectives), and the instruments 
and underlying mechanisms of influence: litigation and military force (coercion), political and 
economic, material and immaterial sanctions and rewards (incentives), forums for dialogue 
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and exchange (persuasion, learning, and/or socialization), and technical and financial assis-
tance (capacity-building).
Figure 3: Categories to analyze governance transfer by regional organizations
Regional 
organization: 
standard-setter,
promoter
Actors within the regional organization, at the regional level:
- Bodies of the regional organization, e.g. secretariat, parliamentary 
assembly, agencies
- States collectively acting as member states
Domestic actors: 
addressee, target
Actors at the national level in member states and/or third countries:
- State actors, e.g. national and/or sub-national government,  
judiciary, legislative
- Non-state actors, e.g. civil society, business, community-based orga-
nizations
Standards:
content, objectives
Norms, rules, and procedures defining legitimate governance institutions
- Good governance
- Rule of law
- Human rights
- Democracy
Mechanisms Instruments
- Litigation and military force (coercion)
- Sanctions and rewards (incentives)
- Assistance (capacity-building)
- Dialogue and exchange (persuasion and socialization)
The remainder of this paper presents a first comparative analysis of the empirical findings on 
the governance transfer of nine regional organizations (Figure 4). The sample arguably covers 
the most important regional organizations on each continent – with the exception of Europe. 
We have consciously excluded the European Union (EU) at this point. While being among the 
first and most active regional organizations that engage in governance transfer, it targets the 
governance institutions of third countries rather than its own members, in contrast to all of 
the other regional organizations in this study (Börzel/van Hüllen forthcoming). We also want 
to avoid being EU-centric by making the EU the normative baseline for governance transfer, 
as it is often done in the literature, either explicitly or implicitly.
Altogether, we cover a wide range of regional organizations that significantly differ with re-
gard to their institutional design and membership. While ECOWAS deals with a broad range 
of issue areas including peace, security, and human development, NAFTA exclusively focuses 
on trade liberalization. Likewise, CAN has created supranational institutions with some sub-
stantive decision-making powers, whereas ASEAN is still controlled by the governments of the 
member states. The ROs also differ with regard to the degree of statehood and regime type of 
their members. ECOWAS and SADC face greater problems of limited statehood, while most of 
the Mercosur and LAS members have sufficient capacities to set and enforce (regional) norms 
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and rules. The ROs in the Americas have an increasingly democratic membership; ASEAN, 
although improving, still ranks significantly lower, and LAS largely consists of (semi-)authori-
tarian regimes. If NAFTA, ASEAN, CAN, LAS, and ECOWAS promote similar standards for 
legitimate governance institutions using the same set of instruments, this should be a strong 
indication for the diffusion of a global script.
We start by providing a general overview of the evolution of governance transfer since the 
foundation of these regional organizations in the post-World War II and post-Cold War era, 
pointing out major similarities and differences. We then engage in a more detailed compari-
son of a set of typical provisions for governance transfer.
Figure 4: Regional organizations
Africa - African Union (AU)
- Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
- Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Americas - Organization of American States (OAS)
- Andean Community (Comunidad Andina de Naciones, CAN)
- Common Market of the South (Mercado Común del Sur, Mercosur)
- North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
Asia - Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Middle East - League of Arab States (LAS)
3. Regional organizations and governance transfer
All of the regional organizations under investigation have started to engage in governance 
transfer at some point and to some extent. While they greatly vary in the timing, intensity, 
and form (content, instruments) of their efforts, the nine ROs follow a trend toward more 
comprehensive standards for national governance institutions and higher degrees of legaliza-
tion and “intrusiveness” into the domestic affairs of their member states. We find instances 
of governance transfer even in the regional organizations that are generally considered least 
likely candidates. As a free-trade agreement, NAFTA was never intended to set standards for 
legitimate governance in its three member states. Yet, two side agreements effectively transfer 
governance institutions in the fields of labor rights and environmental protection (Duina 
forthcoming). Likewise, ASEAN and the LAS have always been among the strongest propo-
nents of the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference. Still, both have recently 
adopted mechanisms to promote human rights standards in their member states: the Arab 
Human Rights Committee in 2008 and the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Hu-
man Rights in 2009 (Jetschke forthcoming; van Hüllen forthcoming-a).
Since the end of the Cold War, regional organizations have included joint commitments to 
standards for domestic governance in their legal foundations and developed policies for gov-
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ernance transfer – especially in the areas of democracy and human rights, and to a lesser ex-
tent regarding the rule of law and good governance. Still, if there is a global governance script 
behind this increasing attention to national governance institutions, it is more of a menu than 
a package. All ROs make general reference to the same broad principles. They differ, however, 
in how far and to what extent these broad principles are translated into specific standards 
to be prescribed, protected, and promoted by the regional organization. While NAFTA and 
ASEAN focus more on good governance and the rule of law, regional organizations in Africa 
and South America are more concerned with democracy and human rights. When it comes 
to the specific content of human rights, especially ASEAN, but also Mercosur and SADC, em-
phasizes the importance of economic and social rights, whereas the OAS and AU pay more 
attention to civil and political rights. Similarly, there is a set of typical provisions and instru-
ments to actively promote and protect the adherence to standards prescribed at the regional 
level – but again, each regional organization seems to pick and choose among these options. 
Also, the gap between the prescription of standards, the policy for their promotion and pro-
tection, and the actual adoption and implementation of measures is wider for some regional 
organizations than for others: Some remain at the level of prescription (ASEAN, LAS), most 
have a more (ECOWAS, SADC, AU) or less (Mercosur, CAN, NAFTA) elaborate policy, but only a 
few implement measures on a regular basis (here, OAS). Overall, when regional organizations 
engage in governance transfer beyond the prescription of standards, they are much stronger 
when protecting the status quo, e.g. against unconstitutional change or massive human rights 
violations, than when actively promoting its improvement. 
The regional organizations with a broader mandate than merely supervising the implementa-
tion of an almost complete contract (NAFTA) can be divided into two groups: On the one hand, 
there are continental organizations for political cooperation that bring together all countries 
within a geographically or culturally defined macro-region, such as the OAS and the AU for 
the Americas and Africa, or the LAS as a pan-Arab organization. On the other hand, there are 
sub-regional organizations that pursue a broad range of objectives but focus on economic and 
security integration among a smaller group of member states, for example ECOWAS within 
West Africa.
The continental organizations are among the oldest regional organizations from the post–
World War II era. From early on, most of them were based on a joint commitment to the 
respect of human rights at the national and regional level, expressed in their founding trea-
ties and specific human rights charters. At the global level, they are an integral part of the 
international human rights regime. Especially since the end of the Cold War, these regional 
organizations have extended the scope of their efforts to include other standards for domestic 
governance institutions, touching upon democracy, the rule of law, and good governance, and 
have added more instruments for their active promotion and protection. The sub-regional or-
ganizations, by contrast, mostly started only in the 1990s to prescribe and promote standards 
for legitimate governance institutions in their member states. This is also the case for ROs 
created long before the end of the Cold War (e.g. ECOWAS, SADC, CAN, or ASEAN). Gover-
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nance transfer by these regional organizations mostly focuses on standards related to human 
rights and democracy.
Most of the continental and sub-regional organizations have developed a similar set of instru-
ments for governance transfer since the 1990s: (1) judicial protection of human rights (coer-
cion); (2) a “democracy clause” that triggers sanctions (incentives) or in some cases military 
interventions (coercion); (3) membership criteria that constitute some form of membership 
conditionality (incentives); (4) election observation missions (EOMs) and election assistance 
(monitoring/incentives/capacity-building); (5) various activities and programs geared toward 
socialization, persuasion, and capacity-building, for example with regard to good governance. 
Before comparing the evolution and content of these provisions across regional organizations, 
we will briefly discuss the normative basis of governance transfer by ROs.
3.1 The basis for governance transfer: The prescription of standards
Most of the continental organizations have been built on common values, in particular hu-
man rights, as demonstrated in the OAS Charter (1948) and the OAU Charter (1963).2 It is these 
organizations that have devised regional human rights charters (see annex 1): The American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) and the American Convention on Human 
Rights (1969) from the OAS, and the African (or Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(1981) from the OAU. The LAS is the exception to the rule: Established in 1945, its founding 
treaties do not refer to common values such as human rights. Even though the LAS started 
dealing with human rights issues in a Permanent Arab Committee on Human Rights in 1968, 
it only adopted an Arab Charter on Human Rights in 2004, after a first failed attempt in 1994. 
By contrast, most of the sub-regional organizations only began to define regional standards 
for governance at the national level during the 1990s. The Andean Community already en-
shrined a joint commitment to democracy and human rights in the Riobamba Charter of 
Conduct (1980). This was taken up only in the preamble of the revised Cartagena Agreement 
(Trujillo Protocol, 1996). CAN dealt with these issues in more detail in 2001/2002, including 
with the adoption of the Andean Charter for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
(2002). Mercosur did not include any commitment to shared values in the Treaty of Asunción 
(1991), but in 1992 it issued its first political declaration, and the Ushuaia Protocol (1998) made 
respect for democracy part of Mercosur’s legal basis. Similarly, in Africa, the SADC Treaty 
(1992) and the ECOWAS Revised Treaty (1993) included references to democracy and human 
rights in their member states. Apart from the Arab League, ASEAN is clearly the odd one out: 
The legally non-binding ASEAN Concord (2003) was the first document to refer to democracy 
as a shared value. It was only in 2007 that member states adopted the ASEAN Charter with a 
joint commitment to democracy, good governance, the rule of law, and human rights.
2 The OAU (Organization of African Unity) is the predecessor of the African Union (AU).
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The purpose and mandate of NAFTA, finally, differ significantly from the other regional orga-
nizations, focusing solely on the creation and implementation of a free-trade area. Therefore, it 
makes sense that NAFTA is not explicitly built on shared political values. The main agreement 
was, however, complemented by two side agreements on sectoral cooperation. Both the North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) and the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) prescribe compliance with sets of national standards 
that touch upon human rights, good governance, and the rule of law (Duina forthcoming).
Figure 5: Content of governance transfer
Democracy Human rights Rule of law Good governance
AU +++ ++++ + ++
ECOWAS ++++ +++ + ++
SADC +++ +++ ++ ++
OAS +++ ++++ + ++
CAN +++ ++ + +
Mercosur +++ ++ + +
NAFTA - + + +
ASEAN + ++ + +
LAS + ++ + ++
Number of  “+” indicates the intensity of governance transfer per issue area, ranging from the mere mention 
of concepts to the prescription of very detailed standards.
As figure 5 shows, all regional organizations have referred at least once to standards for gov-
ernance institutions in their member states related to democracy, human rights, the rule of 
law, and good governance. Especially since the 1990s, ROs have issued a large and increasing 
number of documents that prescribe standards for legitimate governance institutions (see 
annex 1). This illustrates the expansion of governance-related regional provisions across time 
and space. The overview, however, does not convey detailed information on the quality of the 
institutionalization of standards, for example concerning the levels of obligation and preci-
sion, or the scope of issues covered in each domain. To shed more light on these qualitative 
dimensions, we will now discuss the developments and characteristics of governance transfer 
as exemplified by the five instruments for governance transfer developed by most regional 
organizations since the 1990s. 
3.2 Human rights regimes and judicial protection
The OAS and the OAU/AU have established regional human rights regimes based on human 
rights charters (see above) and judicially protected by specific human rights courts. While the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1979) has been active for decades, the African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2004) transformed into the African Court of Justice and Hu-
man Rights in 2008 and is still in the course of being set up. The sub-regional organizations 
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with an economic focus either rely on the human rights regime on the continental level or 
have just recently expanded their dispute settlement mandate to include human rights issues.
At the continental level, the OAS human rights regime offers individuals access to a regional 
system of adjudication. The first pillar is the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
which accepts petitions from persons claiming human rights violations. Upon receiving a 
request, the Commission determines its validity and undertakes to solve the problem in co-
operation with the respective member state. Should the issue not be resolved, the case can be 
forwarded to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the second step, which can then 
issue a judgment ordering the offending state to change its practices, pay compensation, or 
take other measures. Thus, the OAS engages in protecting human rights at the regional level, 
albeit only after national remedies have been exhausted by petitioners and only with regard to 
states that have ratified the relevant article of the organization’s 1969 Convention on Human 
Rights (Lohaus forthcoming). 
As mentioned above, the African Union has not yet put the proposed human rights court into 
operation. Member states decided to create an African Court of Justice and Human Rights in 
2008 to deal with both human rights and other regional legal issues. In contrast to the OAS 
system, this Court is not accessible to individuals via petitions. It accepts cases only from 
member states, AU organs related to human rights, and other registered entities (Leininger 
forthcoming). 
The LAS, in contrast, does not foresee a similar mechanism of judicial protection for its provi-
sions regarding human rights. The only document containing binding standards is the 2004 
Arab Charter of Human Rights, which was adopted by the LAS Council after it became clear 
that the 1994 predecessor document did not have widespread support. However, the Charter 
allows member states room for exceptions, which in some cases can be linked back to Islamic 
traditions such as Sharia law (Rishmawi 2005). After the Charter entered into force in 2008, a 
new Arab Human Rights Committee became operational, and parties to the treaty have since 
been obliged to periodically report to it on the current human rights situation (van Hüllen 
forthcoming-a). However, the Charter’s competencies are extremely weak compared to similar 
bodies in other regional organizations and at the level of the United Nations. It was only in 
2012 that Bahrain proposed creating an Arab Human Rights Court, which has been under 
discussion in the LAS ever since.
Organizations for regional economic integration in South America and Africa operate within 
the regional human rights regimes of the OAS and the AU, respectively. In Mercosur and 
the Andean Community, judicial protection of human rights is left to the OAS’s continental 
regime. While Mercosur’s permanent dispute settlement mechanism might theoretically be 
competent to rule on human rights issues, it has never done so.3 Neither has the Andean Court 
3 Recently, Mercosur’s highest body has touched on the concept of fundamental rights (CMC Decisions 
28/10 and 64/10), which might pave the way for the creation of a full-fledged Mercosur human rights 
court.
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of Justice, since the Andean Community explicitly refers matters to the Inter-American hu-
man rights regime (Ribeiro Hofmann forthcoming; Saldías forthcoming).
By contrast, and maybe because the African human rights regime has so far lacked judicial 
enforcement, the SADC Tribunal and the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice have actively 
sought to protect human rights within their respective jurisdictions. The SADC Tribunal de-
clared itself competent to deal with human rights issues based on the commitments made in 
the SADC Treaty and issued a number of rulings related to human rights from 2007 to 2010. 
One of these cases, Campbell vs. Zimbabwe, led to a dispute about the court’s mandate and 
the legal obligations for member states. When Zimbabwe failed to comply with a judgment, 
the Tribunal demanded action from the SADC Summit. The heads of states, however, decided 
to suspend the court with the intention to amend its mandate, which has been criticized by 
judges and civil society organizations alike. Currently, it is expected that the court will be dis-
solved and replaced by a different and less activist body (van der Vleuten/Hulse forthcoming).
The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice has also accepted human rights cases since 2005, 
when its mandate was broadened to allow individuals to make claims. In the years since, the 
Court has been active and delivered a small number of judgments related to human rights. In 
this context, the Court has pointed out that it will not appeal verdicts by national courts, but 
is available when no national remedies are accessible. Similar to the case of SADC, compliance 
with the judgments might prove to be erratic, as the tribunal has no direct means of enforce-
ment (Hartmann forthcoming).
 
ASEAN, in turn, neither has a human rights charter nor any court or permanent dispute-set-
tlement mechanism that could legally protect human rights standards in its member states. 
The ASEAN Charter (2007), however, laid the foundation for a regional human rights regime. 
In 2009, ASEAN member states created the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Hu-
man Rights, which is mandated to promote and protect human rights in the region (ASEAN 
2009b).
NAFTA, finally, only foresees ad-hoc arbitration and dispute settlement panels in line with the 
overall spirit of the agreements, which are not explicitly mandated to deal with human rights 
issues.
3.3 Democratic clauses for the protection of democracy and human rights
A relatively common feature of regional organizations for the protection of democracy are 
democratic clauses as “multilateral mechanisms for protecting and defending democracy 
when it is unconstitutionally interrupted or threatened by autocratic rulers” (Piccone 2004: 8). 
They serve as an enforcement mechanism for a joint commitment to certain norms, foresee-
ing some form of sanction in the event of non-compliance. The enforcement mechanisms of 
regional organizations in the Americas and Africa are primarily focused on “a strong anti-
coup norm” (Legler/Tieku 2010: 469). Neither NAFTA nor the LAS nor ASEAN have similar 
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provisions (Jetschke forthcoming; van Hüllen forthcoming-a). On the contrary, Article 8 of the 
Charter of the Arab League explicitly postulates that the respective “system of government” is 
an internal affair of the member state and is not to be interfered with.
As early as 1991, the OAS adopted Resolution 1080 on representative democracy, which called 
for a collective response “in the event of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregu-
lar interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise 
of power by the democratically elected government.” Accordingly, member states modified 
the OAS Charter in 1992 with the Protocol of Washington, inserting a new Article 9 that pre-
scribes diplomatic initiatives and ultimately the suspension of membership in response to the 
overthrow of a democratically elected government (Lohaus forthcoming). 
Mercosur and the Andean Community followed the example of the OAS and established sim-
ilar clauses, with the Ushuaia Protocol (1998) to the Treaty of Asunción and an Additional 
Protocol (2000) to the Cartagena Agreement, respectively. Should the democratic order be dis-
rupted in a member state, both documents prescribe consultations at the regional level and 
allow for membership rights – ranging from participation in meetings to enjoying economic 
benefits – to be suspended. Thus, all of our ROs in the Americas, with the exception of NAFTA, 
make the enjoyment of membership rights conditional upon upholding democratic order. 
It should be noted, however, that sanctions against non-democratic member states are not 
automatic, but rather depend on consultation and consensus among the others. Moreover, 
the documents do not precisely define violations of democratic standards (Ribeiro Hofmann 
forthcoming; Saldías forthcoming).
When the AU codified a similar clause in its Constitutive Act of 2000, it could draw on earlier 
declarations of the OAU from the late 1990s (Legler/Tieku 2010: 469; Piccone 2004: 25). In ad-
dition to Article 30 of the Constitutive Act, which allows for the suspension of membership 
rights if a government comes to power through unconstitutional means, the AU adopted an-
other declaration in Lomé in 2000 on the framework for an AU response to unconstitutional 
changes of government. This Lomé Declaration specifies instances of non-compliance and 
adds fact-finding missions and “limited and targeted sanctions” to the list of possible respons-
es. While some observers claim that this clause is meant to protect any regime, democratic or 
not, against its “unconstitutional” removal (Piccone 2004: 25), the Lomé Declaration always 
refers to threats to “democratically elected governments.” The 2007 African Charter on De-
mocracy, Elections and Governance also specifies that the AU will sanction acts that interfere 
with democratically elected governments, such as coups or the refusal of incumbents to vacate 
office after a lost election (African Union 2007). 
Interestingly, ECOWAS and SADC both introduced their response mechanisms in the context 
of conflict prevention. ECOWAS did so with the 1999 “Protocol Relating to the Mechanism 
for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security” and the 2001 
“Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance,” and SADC with the 2001 “Protocol on Poli-
tics, Defence and Security Cooperation.” These protocols extend the scope of non-compliance 
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to any situation putting regional stability at risk, which includes coups d’état but also serious 
human rights violations, and they elaborate on a mechanism for collective response that in-
cludes military interventions. In the case of ECOWAS, decisions on regional interventions are 
taken by the Mediation and Security Council, which comprises only nine of the fifteen mem-
ber states and can decide by qualified majority. With the additional protocol adopted in 2001, 
the ECOWAS member states agreed on a comprehensive list of standards, offering more pre-
cise criteria to identify violations. The first article clearly states that “every accession to power 
must be made through free, fair and transparent elections” and that ECOWAS members will 
not tolerate exceptions. Similar to ECOWAS, SADC has a specific organ dedicated to security 
issues, which is empowered by the aforementioned 2001 protocol to recommend “enforcement 
actions” to the heads of states in the case of massive violations of democracy or human rights 
(Hartmann forthcoming; van der Vleuten/Hulse forthcoming).
The OAS and AU have further developed their democracy protection mechanisms with the 
adoption of democratic charters: the Inter-American Democratic Charter (2001) and the Afri-
can Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (2007). These documents “offer unprec-
edented detailed definitions of democracy, elaborate in some cases innovative instruments to 
responding to coups d’état as well as authoritarian backsliding, and provisions for interna-
tional election monitoring” (Legler/Tieku 2010: 466). The major difference between the Amer-
ican and African provisions is the inclusion of military force among the response mechanisms 
in the African organizations, which is completely absent from the American context.
 
Interestingly, even in the 2004 Arab Charter of Human Rights, there is a reference to every 
citizen’s right to “pursue a political activity,” run for public office, or participate in fair elec-
tions. The same Article 24, however, also states that these rights can be restricted according 
to national law if it seems necessary in the interest of, inter alia, “national security or public 
safety, public health or morals” (League of Arab States 2004).
3.4 Democratic membership conditionality between protection and promotion
While references to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as “fundamental principles” 
or “common values” have spread among regional organizations since the 1990s, few link them 
explicitly to preconditions for joining the club. Regional organizations outside of Europe rare-
ly make accession subject to an explicit democratic conditionality (Mansfield/Pevehouse 2008: 
274). The organizations either have no stipulations on accession in their treaties (OAS, NAFTA, 
ECOWAS, LAS) or when they do, these do not refer back to any fundamental principles (Merco-
sur: Art. 20, Treaty of Asunción; CAN: Art. 151, Cartagena Agreement; AU: Art. 29, Constitutive 
Act; SADC: Art. 8, SADC Treaty; ASEAN: Art. 6, ASEAN Charter). The South American organi-
zations have, however, adopted decisions that explicitly ask new member states to ratify all of 
the relevant protocols, including those containing clauses for the protection of democracy, de 
facto making accession conditional upon democracy (Lohaus forthcoming; Ribeiro Hofmann 
forthcoming; Saldías forthcoming).
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While accession to any of the ROs implies adherence to all provisions of the treaties, it is 
not obvious whether democratic membership conditionality has been consistently put into 
practice since regional organizations committed their member states to respecting demo-
cratic principles, human rights, and the rule of law. This was clearly not the case when the 
Democratic Republic of Congo joined SADC in 1997 (van der Vleuten/Hulse forthcoming). In 
the case of Mercosur, there is controversy over Venezuela. Since the heads of state accepted its 
request to join in 2006, members of parliament in Brazil and Paraguay have refused to give 
their consent, citing doubts about the country’s democratic character. Whereas Brazil’s Senate 
approved Venezuela’s accession in 2010, Venezuela joined in 2012 without ratification by Para-
guay, during a time when the latter was itself suspended from Mercosur due to non-democrat-
ic incidents (Ribeiro Hofmann forthcoming). This example illustrates the ambiguity of broad 
reference to democratic values: when there are no clearly defined criteria for membership, the 
respective clauses are bound to become topics of controversy. By contrast, the government 
of Mexico faced an informal, ex ante democratic conditionality during NAFTA negotiations, 
even though the agreements do not include any such stipulations (Duina forthcoming).
The average democratic performance of member states in the different regional organiza-
tions is mixed (see annex 2). It clearly improved for the African organizations in the 1990s (AU, 
ECOWAS, SADC) and it is worst in the organizations that have only recently established com-
mitments (ASEAN, LAS). However, this says little about whether the democratic performance 
of member states is the result of changing membership conditions in ROs, or whether it is 
rather the other way round.
3.5 Democracy promotion and protection: The focus on elections
Election assistance is often the only form of democracy promotion by regional organizations 
in their member states. It aims at institution- and capacity-building, for example by devising 
independent national electoral authorities or providing basic equipment to conduct elections, 
such as polling booths and ballot boxes. The more common feature, however, consists of elec-
tion observation missions (EOMs) sent to monitor the free and fair conduct of elections.
An important attribute of the election observation agencies associated with regional 
IGOs [International Governmental Organizations], such as the OSCE and OAS, is 
their autonomy, meaning that they draft and issue their reports independently of 
decisions about enforcement taken within the IGO’s intergovernmental bodies. 
(Donno 2010: 602)
The monitoring agency’s assessment has important publicity and information effects (Donno 
2010: 603). It also forms the basis of international responses, both by individual actors and 
collectively in the framework of regional organizations. Systematic EOMs are therefore an 
indispensable basis for the implementation of democratic clauses and part of democracy pro-
tection efforts. The prevalence of election assistance and observation mechanisms in regional 
organizations reflects a strong focus on electoral democracy. Except for ASEAN and NAFTA, 
Governance Transfer by Regional Organizations |  18
all of the other ROs deploy EOMs to their member states on a more or less regular basis. Even 
the LAS has an election observation office in the General Secretariat and sends out observers 
upon request. 
By comparison, policies for election assistance and observation are much more developed 
in Africa and the Americas. The OAS in particular has a long history of election assistance 
and EOMs. Observer missions have been a part of the organization’s activities since the early 
1960s, although their legal basis was only established in 1989 through a resolution by the 
General Assembly. The 2001 Democratic Charter then contained further references to EOMs, 
stating that such missions should aim to strengthen and develop electoral processes (Lohaus 
forthcoming).
More recently, Mercosur and CAN have started to engage in additional election observation. In 
2008, Mercosur created a body dedicated to this purpose (Decisions 24/06 and 05/07), after the 
RO had sent an ad-hoc mission to Bolivia in 2005. Since then, a few missions were conducted 
(Ribeiro Hofmann forthcoming). The Andean Community introduced the Andean Electoral 
Council in 2003. This body is comprised of national electoral officials and has mainly an ad-
visory nature; however, it has recently observed referendums held in Bolivia and Venezuela, as 
well as the election of the Ecuadorian Supreme Court (Saldías forthcoming).
The AU has also deployed election observation missions to its member states since 1989, when 
it sent observers to Namibia in cooperation with the UN. In 2002, the organization adopted 
the Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections, which prescribed a list of 
standards for democratic elections, prompted member states to invite observer missions, and 
tasked the organization’s General Secretariat with developing a specialized unit to manage 
those missions (African Union/OAU 2002). As a result, the Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
Unit (DEAU) was formally established in 2006. The 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elec-
tions and Governance then reaffirmed the concept of election observation. In this document, 
EOMs are named as important factors to foster the “regularity, transparency and credibility of 
elections,” and Article 18 requires all parties to the treaty to invite AU observers to every elec-
tion (African Union 2007). Considering that the Charter just recently entered into force after 
its ratification by the 15th member state, the EOM system in the AU is stronger than ever (Afri-
can Union 2012). However, the organization’s practices have been criticized: While claiming to 
have conducted more than 100 missions up to 2003, the AU has not documented their findings 
well (Kelley 2012: 37). Currently, only reports for missions from 2009 and 2010 are available on 
the website (AU DEAU 2012).
In addition, both ECOWAS and SADC have more recently elaborated their own guidelines and 
started to send missions in 1990 and 2004, respectively. For ECOWAS, the legal basis for these 
procedures dates back to the 1993 Revised Treaty and was broadened in the 1999 Protocol on 
Conflict Prevention. The 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance describes the 
procedure of election observation in more detail than earlier documents. It has even been 
interpreted as giving ECOWAS permission to dispatch a mission without the need for an in-
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vitation by the concerned member state. In practice, the RO has sent missions to almost every 
election since 2004, albeit varying in size and mandate: some of them served narrow fact-find-
ing purposes, while others included up to 300 observers. In 2008, the organization published 
a handbook for EOM staff (Hartmann forthcoming).
Finally, SADC has been equally active in the field of election observation in recent years. Based 
on the 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation as well as the non-binding 
2004 Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections – which were inspired by the 
corresponding AU document – SADC can send observer missions on invitation by member 
states. The 2004 document contains guidelines for the proceedings of observer missions and 
a code of conduct for EOM staff, as well as the responsibilities of host countries. Between 2004 
and 2011, SADC sent missions to 25 out of 27 elections; the reports, however, are not univer-
sally accessible to the public and contain generally favorable assessments, including for cases 
in which irregularities were noted. Recently, the reports appear to focus more thoroughly on 
the criteria outlined in the 2004 Guidelines document (van der Vleuten/Hulse forthcoming).
3.6 Good governance: The fight against corruption
Within the area of good governance and the rule of law, the majority of regional organizations 
under analysis have become active in fighting corruption. Besides other aspects of transpar-
ency, public sector reform, and legal harmonization, the fight against corruption is a suitable 
example to illustrate the similarities and differences across regions. The fight against corrup-
tion entered the agenda of regional organizations between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s, 
with most ROs dedicating a single-purpose treaty to the issue. With its mixture of provisions 
for legal harmonization, codes of conduct for governance, and regional mechanisms for coop-
eration, it touches on several aspects of governance transfer.
In 1996, the OAS adopted the Inter-American Convention against Corruption. This document 
identifies corruption as an obstacle to democracy, justice, and development; provides a defini-
tion of corrupt practices; and calls upon member states to fight them. To this end, the treaty 
provides for preventive measures, capacity-building, and legal cooperation. These commit-
ments were further developed with the 1997 Program for Cooperation, the 2001 Mechanism 
for Follow-Up on the Implementation (MESICIC), and the 2006 renewed Program for Coop-
eration. Overall, the establishment of a dedicated body to coordinate anti-corruption activities 
and the multiple additional documents suggest that the issue is high on the OAS agenda. The 
MESICIC produces periodic reports on the regional as a whole and on individual parties to the 
treaty (Lohaus forthcoming). 
NAFTA does not have an explicit anti-corruption policy, but its agreements implicitly build on 
the observance of rule of law and good governance standards in the three member states, as 
well as on their compliance with international anti-corruption norms. Within Latin America, 
the Andean Community also engages in the transfer of anti-corruption norms, rules, and pro-
cedures. Both the 1999 Decision 458 by the Foreign Ministers’ Council and the 2001 Declara-
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tion of Machu Picchu mention this goal. In 2007, Decision 668 adopted the Andean Plan for 
the Fight against Corruption, which includes setting up an Executive Committee to address 
the issue. In the plan of action, the RO aims to tackle a variety of aspects, ranging from pub-
lic education to domestic legal and operational reforms (prevention) to prosecution (Saldías 
forthcoming). Mercosur does not feature similar clauses. Instead, the RO explicitly refers to 
the provision of the UN and OAS anti-corruption regimes. This is exemplified in the state-
ment from the 34th meeting of the Common Market Council in 2010, which expressed that 
member states shall take action against corruption in accordance with the aforementioned 
international rules (Mercosur 2010).
In the African context, the AU adopted its Convention on Preventing and Combating Corrup-
tion in 2003. In this document, the African Union members delivered a list of acts deemed 
corrupt and called for all parties to the treaty to outlaw them. Thus, much of the treaty is 
aimed at harmonizing legal provisions. Furthermore, the Convention asks for international 
cooperation and coordination, and an Advisory Board on Corruption is established as a follow-
up mechanism. In 2011, the AU heads of state adopted an Anti-Corruption Action Plan (Leini-
nger forthcoming).
ECOWAS also targets corruption with a dedicated treaty. Its basis was established in the 1999 
Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, which briefly asked member states to 
“fight corruption and manage their national resources in a transparent manner” (Article 31). 
In 2001, this provision was followed by the Protocol on the Fight Against Corruption. This 
document defines corrupt behavior and obliges states to change their legal provisions accord-
ingly. Moreover, states are asked to provide assistance to other parties to the treaties, and the 
Protocol requires the establishment of national Central Authorities to deal with all issues 
pertaining to the document. In addition, the document established the ECOWAS Anti-Cor-
ruption Commission, which is tasked with fostering cooperation and the flow of information, 
providing training and assistance, and monitoring the domestic implementation of regional 
rules. It should be noted, however, that the Protocol has not yet entered into force because it 
lacks the required number of ratifications (Hartmann forthcoming).
SADC adopted its 2001 Protocol Against Corruption shortly before ECOWAS. It has been rati-
fied by 13 out of 15 member states. Similar to the previously mentioned documents, the Pro-
tocol defines corruption and requires member states to fight it by means of legal provisions, 
as well as through good practices in running the government. Each party to the treaty is to 
send representatives to a regional committee to oversee implementation. The anti-corruption 
agenda is reflected in later documents, such as the 2003 Regional Strategic Indicative Action 
Plan or the 2004 Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ, which reiterate the target of combat-
ing corruption (van der Vleuten/Hulse forthcoming).
The Arab League enacted an Arab Convention to Fight Corruption in 2010, which has been 
signed by 19 out of the 22 LAS members but has not yet entered into force (van Hüllen forth-
coming-a). While it refers to other international instruments, such as the United Nations Con-
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vention Against Corruption, it leaves ample scope for the interpretation of its provisions and 
their implementation “in accordance with domestic legislation” (League of Arab States 2010). 
ASEAN, finally, places little emphasis on the issue of corruption, and differs from other orga-
nizations by not directly requiring member states to change national law. However, anti-cor-
ruption agencies from eight member states signed a “memorandum of understanding,” and 
the 2009 Political-Security Community Blueprint (part of the Cha-Am Hua Hin Roadmap) at 
least acknowledges the importance of this issue (ASEAN 2009a). 
Overall, anti-corruption provisions are one of the most prominent instances of governance 
transfer in the area of good governance and the rule of law. Six out of the nine ROs under 
investigation have binding documents on the issue, another one explicitly refers to other in-
ternational agreements, and one has at least shown first indications of addressing the issue. 
Regarding the contents, there are strong similarities: Given the nature of the task, all docu-
ments provide definitions of corruption and ask for domestic legal provisions to criminalize 
and prosecute such practices. In addition, there appears to be a tendency to rely on mutual 
assistance, training of public officials, and some form of regional, centralized monitoring to 
foster the implementation of measures.
4. Discussion
4.1 The emergence of a global script?
Today, major regional organizations at least make reference to democracy, human rights, the 
rule of law, and good governance as standards for the governance institutions of their mem-
ber states. The idea of governance transfer has spread around the globe. Figure 6 presents an 
overview of the governance transfers of nine major ROs with regard to the five typical features 
we identified. Overall, there is a clear trend toward a broader and more detailed prescription 
of standards, as well as a growing number of instruments adopted by the organizations. Hu-
man rights are increasingly codified at the regional level. ROs have also become more active in 
the realm of good governance and the rule of law as exemplified by the case of anti-corruption 
measures.
4.2 The “localization” of governance transfer
Despite these common trends, we find systematic differences among the governance trans-
fers of these nine ROs. With regard to the prescription of standards, the protection of human 
rights by judicial means varies greatly. African and Latin American ROs have elaborated stan-
dards on democracy and human rights. ASEAN and NAFTA, by contrast, have focused more 
on rule of law and good governance. At the same time, ECOWAS and SADC have spelled out 
democratic norms in more detail and guard them by anti-coup provisions and increasingly 
institutionalized observer missions. Finally, the continental ROs, with the exception of the 
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LAS, developed comprehensive regimes of civil and political rights, while SADC, Mercosur 
and ASEAN emphasize social and economic rights. 
Figure 6: Instruments of governance transfer by regional organizations
AU ECOWAS SADC OAS CAN Mercosur NAFTA ASEAN LAS
1) Judicial protection of human rights (litigation)a
(XX) X (X) XX (OAS)d - - - -
2) Democracy (and human rights) clause (mediation, sanctions, military intervention)b
X XX XX X X X - - -
3) Democratic membership conditionality (incentives)c
(X) (X) (X) - (X) (X) - - -
4) Election observation and assistance (dialogue, assistance)
X X X X X X - - X
5) Anti-corruption policies (dialogue, assistance)
X X X X x (OAS)d - - -
a  X = court of justice dealing with human rights issues; XX = human rights court; (X)/(XX) = court not op-
erational
b  X = mediation and sanctions (incl. suspension); XX = mediation, sanctions (incl. suspension), and military 
intervention
c  (X) = implicit membership conditionality, e.g. through democracy clause
d  (RO) = task explicitly referred to another regional organization
When it comes to the promotion and protection of standards, the Latin American ROs have 
left the enforcement of human rights to the OAS, whereas in Africa we do not find such a di-
vision of labor between the continental and sub-regional organizations. ECOWAS and SADC 
have developed more detailed standards and a greater variety of instruments than Mercosur 
and CAN. ECOWAS and SADC are also more active than their Latin American counterparts. 
So are the two continental ROs, OAS and AU, whereas LAS, ASEAN, and NAFTA hardly engage 
in the promotion and protection of standards.
Our findings suggest that regional organizations may indeed follow a “global script” for gov-
ernance transfer, translating into institutional isomorphism through coercion, mimicry, and 
lesson-drawing (cf. Börzel/Risse 2012a; DiMaggio/Powell 1991; Strang/Meyer 1993). Yet, while 
we have identified certain institutional trends, we are still a far cry from institutional conver-
gence. The differences we find between the governance transfers of our nine ROs indicate that 
the process of diffusion we may observe is “localized” (Acharya 2004), meaning that it is driven 
or at least mitigated by region-specific, domestic factors. Regional organizations choose from 
a menu of standards and instruments rather than simply “downloading” the whole package, 
resulting in significant variation in the adoption of the global script both across time and 
space.
To account for such variation, we need to adopt a more agency-based approach, which does not 
treat ROs and their member states as passive recipients of a global script but rather as political 
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agents that adopt and adapt global standards in a “dynamic process of matchmaking” (Acharya 
2004: 243) to make them fit to their strategic interests and normative beliefs.
4.3 Toward explaining governance transfer
The literature does not provide a theoretical approach that would be capable of explaining 
our double finding of growing similarities and persisting differences in governance transfer 
by regional organizations. Diffusion theories expect convergence, while institutionalist ap-
proaches emphasize regional particularities (Börzel 2012; Jetschke forthcoming). We adopt a 
more agency-based perspective to look for theoretical building blocks that might help solve 
our puzzle. Governance transfer by regional organizations can be conceived of as the institu-
tional choice of member state governments (Koremenos et al. 2001), which, however, may be 
driven not only by rational but also by normative factors. Moreover, some of the drivers may 
explain why member state governments decide to engage in governance transfer at the region-
al level in the first place, while others account for the form (standards, instruments) that they 
choose (cf. Weyland 2008). The former drivers have been referred to as demand factors and the 
latter as supply factors (Jupille/Snidal 2006; Mattli 1999). However, the distinctions between 
rational vs. normative and demand vs. supply factors do not provide a theory of governance 
transfer. Rather, they are a first step toward building a theoretical framework that will help 
integrate arguments found in different literature in order to explain when and how regional 
organizations engage in governance transfer. 
Figure 7: Demand and supply of governance transfer
Rational Normative
Demand Lock-in of democratic reforms, 
curbing negative externalities, 
signaling
(1)
International legitimacy
(3)
Supply Active:  regional hegemon, donors,  
 external powers
Passive: functional reference model 
(2)
Active:  promotion of global script
Passive: normative reference model
(4)
4.3.1 The rational demand for governance transfer: Democratic lock-in, curbing negative 
externalities, and signaling
In line with the literature on international democracy promotion and the renewed interest 
in comparative regionalism, there is a growing body of research on the role of regional or-
ganizations for democracy and human rights at the national level. Quantitative studies have 
established a link between the democratic quality of states and their membership in regional 
organizations (e.g. Dimitrova/Pridham 2004; Mansfield/Pevehouse 2006, 2008; Pevehouse 
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2005; Simmons et al. 2008). The argument that states use regional organizations to “lock in” 
democratic developments is strongly supported by the different timing of governance trans-
fer in our regional organizations in the different regions. The development of “democratic 
clauses” in Latin America and Africa has to be evaluated against the backdrop of frequent 
regime changes in these regions. The initial focus on preventing “unconstitutional change” 
clearly suggests that it was not so much democratic governance that was to be protected, but 
rather incumbent regimes in general. However, the respective provisions have become more 
specific over time, to the extent that especially the African regional organizations now explic-
itly condemn several types of anti-democratic behavior, including acts by incumbents. While 
the decision to intervene or to refrain from doing so is still up to member states, the stan-
dards prescribed by ROs have become more precise and pro-democratic. At the same time, the 
mandate of regional organizations in Africa to intervene with military force, is remarkable. It 
goes hand in hand with an overall strong focus on security issues, which is also reflected in a 
unique set of security-related bodies that defy the idea that regional organizations in Africa 
are foremost an emulation of “Western” models of regional integration.
 
Overall, our findings confirm arguments in the literature that democratizing countries seek 
to lock in democratic reforms at the regional level. This would also explain why ASEAN and 
LAS are lagging behind compared to ROs in Latin America and Africa when it comes to defin-
ing standards related to democratic governance or the regional protection of human rights 
(see annex 2). While the Mexican government employed NAFTA in a similar way, the US and 
Canada were more concerned about the enforcement of social and environmental standards to 
avoid competitive disadvantages for their industry, which accounts for NAFTA’s stronger em-
phasis on the rule of law and good governance than on democracy and human rights (Duina 
forthcoming). For Mercosur, it appears that the transition toward more left-leaning govern-
ments in the early 2000s has favored governance transfers from the regional level (Ribeiro 
Hofmann forthcoming). 
Using regional organizations to lock in domestic institutions does not only work for democra-
tizing states, though. Authoritarian governments in Africa have instrumentalized their mem-
bership in the AU and the ECOWAS to bolster the sovereignty and legitimacy of their regimes 
(Levitsky/Way 2010: 363-364; Söderbaum 2004). This may explain why the Arab League, the 
Gulf Cooperation Council or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have started to endorse 
standards of good governance, too (Haimerl forthcoming; Schneider forthcoming). They help 
legitimize certain policies, for example in the fight against terrorism, and may provide a plat-
form from which to launch a counter discourse against the hegemony of “liberal universal-
ism” on which global standards of human rights, democracy, rule of law, and good governance 
are based.
In addition to locking in (changes in) the regime type, two other factors can motivate member 
states to institutionalize democracy and human rights standards in regional organizations. 
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First, coups d’état and massive human rights violations may produce substantial negative ex-
ternalities for neighboring countries. Flows of refugees or rebel forces often challenge the sta-
bility of an entire region. West African countries have suffered from a particularly high share 
of the continent’s coups d’état (Striebinger 2012), and the roots of integration in the southern 
sub-region lie in security cooperation among the post-colonial Frontline States (van der Vleu-
ten/Hulse forthcoming). It is no coincidence that the African Union, ECOWAS and SADC have 
developed their governance transfers in the area of democracy and human rights within the 
framework of conflict prevention, tying their enforcement to the use of military coercion, even 
without the consent of the member state concerned. In a similar vein, ASEAN’s recent focus on 
democracy and human rights is at least partly related to the negative externalities that Myan-
mar’s repressive regime has produced for its neighbors, Thailand in particular. While ASEAN 
member states have been eager to guard their sovereignty, cross-border problems produced by 
political upheaval in Myanmar and Indonesia have induced them to depart from the “ASEAN
Way,” compromising the strict principle of non-interference in domestic affairs (Jetschke 
forthcoming). After all, regional cooperation in ASEAN has also been about strengthening 
the statehood of its member states, protecting them against external intervention, fending 
off (trans)national challenges to their monopolies on force (e.g. communist or secessionist 
insurgences), and fostering their capacities to provide collective goods and services. The Arab 
League’s surprisingly active role in the development of the “Arab Spring” since January 2011 
also suggests an interest in regional stability and security that overrides the principle of non-
interference in domestic affairs (van Hüllen forthcoming-b). The LAS has only taken action in 
cases where the violent clashes between protesters and security forces escalated into a civil war, 
especially in Libya and Syria and to a lesser extent in Bahrain and Yemen. In its engagement, 
it has not taken a consistent stance for or against regime change and democratization, but has 
rather stressed the need to return to order and sacrificed incumbent rulers to the demand for 
political change if necessary.
Second, institutional lock-in at the regional level is not only about committing successor 
governments to domestic reforms, democratic or otherwise. It can also constitute a signal-
ing mechanism by which incumbent regimes seek to publicly commit themselves to certain 
standards that external donors or investors care about.4 Domestic and regional stability are 
important to attract capital and technology, which again provides an incentive to engage in 
governance transfer for both democratic and non-democratic regimes. After all, autocratic 
rulers rely on economic prosperity for their domestic legitimacy (Solingen 2008). This is par-
ticularly the case in areas of limited statehood where states lack the capacity, and often also 
the willingness, to ensure governance standards that are essential for business actors, such as 
the rule of law or minimal human rights. By prescribing an independent judiciary, transpar-
ency of the legal system, and accountability of the police forces, SADC, for example, has hoped 
to both please its donors and become more attractive for foreign direct investments (van der 
Vleuten/Hulse forthcoming). 
4 On signaling and international institutions see, for example, Fearon (1997) or Schultz (1998).
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4.3.2 The rational supply of governance transfer: Regional hegemons, donors, external 
powers, and functional reference models
The quest to lock in democratic reforms, curb negative externalities, and send signals to ex-
ternal actors provides important motivations for states to engage in governance transfer at the 
regional level. It may explain when and why governance transfer by regional organizations 
emerges. It says little, however, about which standards and instruments are chosen. The litera-
ture has identified three important supply factors: the leadership of a regional hegemon, the 
push from donors and external powers, and the existence of a success model.
Realist theories of International Relations point to powerful states that are willing to and 
capable of acting as “regional paymaster, easing distributional tensions and thus smoothing 
the path of integration” (Gilpin 1987: 87-90; Keohane/Nye 1977: 44; Mattli 1999: 56). The US as 
a regional hegemon for NAFTA shaped its institutional design into a complete contract that 
has preserved rather than mitigated the power asymmetry between the US and the other two 
members (Clarkson 2008). Likewise, Brazil and Argentina have resisted Mercosur’s movement 
beyond intergovernmental decision-making that could undermine the dominant position of 
their presidents (Gomez Mera 2005; Hummel/Lohaus 2012). A hegemon throwing its weight 
behind a regional organization’s governance transfer not only matters for the prescription and 
institutionalization of standards and policies at the regional level; its willingness to adhere to 
the rules and to enforce them also has a crucial influence on their application and effective-
ness (Striebinger 2012).
Hegemonic leadership requires the active exercise of coercive or bargaining power by a re-
gional state. It can also be exercised by external actors. The European Union, for instance, has 
supported Mercosur, CAN, and SADC with technical and financial assistance in prescribing 
and promoting governance standards (Lenz 2012; Saldías 2010). Likewise, France and the UK 
as former colonial powers have sought to shape the governance transfer of ECOWAS and SADC 
(Hartmann forthcoming; van der Vleuten/Hulse forthcoming).
Finally, external actors or institutions can also passively influence institutional choices by 
providing a successful model from which to draw lessons (Börzel/Risse 2009a, 2012a). Facing 
a problem, actors look around for institutional solutions that are suitable to solving it. The 
United Nations constitutes this type of success model. So does the European Union. European 
integration has not only fostered peace and prosperity among its members; the EU also prides 
itself on having successfully transformed the governance institutions in Central and Eastern 
Europe after the end of the Cold War. Hence, the EU may provide an important reference or fo-
cal point – although not necessarily the only one – to design governance transfer at the region-
al level (Goldstein/Keohane 1993). For instance, it has informed ASEAN’s first major attempts 
at governance transfer, launched with the ASEAN Charter of 2007. With it, the member states 
have sought to overcome ASEAN’s failure to address joint problems, such as the Asian finan-
cial crisis of 1997/1998, and the negative externalities produced by the human rights violations 
of Myanmar and Indonesia in the East Timor conflict (Jetschke 2010; Jetschke/Murray 2012). 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 42 • January 2013  |  27
4.3.3 The normative demand for governance transfer: International legitimacy
It is not only functional rationalities that spur the demand for governance transfer by region-
al organizations. Next to lesson-drawing, which is based on instrumental rationality, actors 
may also emulate others for normative reasons, to increase their legitimacy (symbolic imita-
tion) (Polillo/Guillén 2005), or to simply imitate their behavior because its appropriateness is 
taken for granted (mimicry) (Haveman 1993; Meyer/Rowan 1977). States have their regional 
organizations adopt global standards for legitimate governance in order to gain or increase 
international legitimacy and bolster their international reputation by signaling a strong com-
mitment to generally accepted standards for legitimate governance. Symbolic imitation and 
mimicry provide an alternative explanation for ASEAN’s or the AU’s (partial) emulation of 
EU institutions of governance transfer. While governance transfer may help to curb nega-
tive externalities, lock in democratic reforms, and send signals to donors and investors, the 
EU is a very different regional organization from the AU and ASEAN. This raises questions 
about the functionality of “downloading” its institutions into a very distinct regional context. 
ASEAN was seen for a long time as incompatible with the EU mode of regional integration. 
Nevertheless, as Jetschke argues, ASEAN has emulated EU institutions to vindicate its interna-
tional reputation as a regional organization capable of ensuring peace and prosperity among 
its members, which was severely damaged after the Asian financial crisis (see above).
4.3.4 The normative supply of governance transfer: Global scripts and normative focal 
points
The quest for international legitimacy and reputation is closely, if not inseparably, linked to 
the existence of a normative model to be followed. This can take the form of a normative focal 
or reference point, as the EU or the United Nations have provided for ASEAN, Merocsur, CAN, 
ECOWAS, SADC, or the AU. Or else there is a global script (Meyer et al. 1997) that determines 
which activities are appropriate for regional organizations to engage in, including setting and 
promoting standards for legitimate governance institutions in their member states. From this 
perspective, the EU plays a major part in diffusing this global script rather than being its sole 
or main reference point. While our findings support the existence of such a global script, the 
role of the EU as an active supplier of governance transfer seems to be limited. It does pro-
mote regionalism and engages in governance transfer toward third countries; yet, there is no 
evidence that the EU seeks to “export” its own regional model of governance transfer (Börzel/
Risse 2009a). If at all, the EU has served as a passive reference point, whose influence rests on 
its attraction as a globally accepted success model of regional integration. Whether the EU will 
continue to inspire other regions in designing their institutions depends not least on how 
well the EU handles the current financial crisis.
Our findings suggest that demand and supply need to accumulate in order to result in the 
institutionalization of governance transfer at the regional level. Rather than pitching a ratio-
nalist against a normative model, as it often occurs in the literature (cf. Börzel/Risse 2009a; 
Börzel/Risse 2009b), we see the different factors as complementary (Börzel/Risse 2012b; Lenz 
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2012). Whereas the spread of a global script may explain why we see ever more governance 
transfer at the regional level, the need to curb negative externalities or lock in democratic re-
forms may account for particular timing, and the prominence of the EU or other international 
actors as focal points, both functional and normative, could elucidate the specific form that 
governance transfer takes.
5. Conclusion
This paper mapped the governance transfer of nine regional organizations in the Americas, 
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. We analyzed the objectives, approaches, and instruments 
these regional organizations use to promote the creation and transformation of governance 
institutions in their target countries. The comparison of major regional organizations pro-
vides some clear evidence for the diffusion of a global governance script through which re-
gional organizations have adopted similar standards and instruments. At the same time, we 
find important differences with regard to when and how these nine regional organizations 
prescribe and promote “good” governance institutions at the national level.
Research on diffusion and comparative regionalism is ill-equipped to account for this double 
finding of increasing similarities and persisting differences. Whereas the former expects in-
stitutional convergence toward a global model, the latter emphasizes regional particularities. 
Regional particularities certainly matter. In many cases, provisions that are established once 
tend to be developed in more detail over time. Examples of this include the growing body of 
human rights documents and the increasingly precise provisions to protect democracy. More-
over, it might explain why some ROs stay clear of certain aspects of governance transfer that 
are not connected to their initial mandate and mode of action. Yet, regional and local actors 
follow similar normative and functional rationalities when they decide to engage in gover-
nance transfer. More agency-centered approaches, which focus on factors that elicit states’ de-
mand for governance transfer, on the one hand, and that shape its institutional design, on the 
other, might be more appropriate to account for the similarities and differences we observe. 
This is particularly true if normative and functional rationalities are seen as alternative rather 
than competing explanations. This approach is also better equipped to explore how regional 
and domestic contexts filter the adoption of and adaptation to global norms (Acharya 2004). If 
states emulate a particular model, they rarely just “download” it, but rather pick and choose 
the institutional components from a menu of options as they see fit. And even if they copy a 
particular model, as CAN did in the case of its court, the meaning and function of the model 
may change in the process of adaptation (Saldías 2007).
The rise of governance transfer by regional organizations may indicate the diffusion of a glob-
al script. Regional organizations in different parts of the world certainly emulate each other. 
Yet, they also look for normative or functional solutions “closer to home.” Rather than the 
European Union or the Council of Europe (Alter 2012; Jetschke/Murray 2012; Lenz 2012), their 
main reference point for institutional emulation may be other ROs in the same region or on 
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the same continent. Often, standards that are promoted by the United Nations or continen-
tal organizations are likely to be picked up by other ROs, either by replicating or referencing 
them. Our case studies, as well as the broader literature, further suggest that a variety of actors 
can play important roles in influencing diffusion processes. These can include epistemic com-
munities, such as constitutional judges who are connected within and across regions (Saldías 
2010); advocacy groups and civil society organizations with formal or informal channels to the 
regional level (Krome 2012); or donor agencies and consultants that might be involved in the 
planning and drafting of documents (Lenz 2012). Further research will have to trace in more 
detail how and through which actors the global governance script has diffused.
We close the paper with a note of caution. While we find instances of governance transfer in all 
regional organizations – even in unlikely cases, such as NAFTA, ASEAN and the LAS – we have 
yet to see whether they actually make a difference on the ground. So far, we have little reason 
to expect that regional organizations help close the governance gap in areas of limited state-
hood. First, the role of regional organizations as independent agents of governance transfer 
or “teachers of norms” (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998) seems to be limited. In most of our cases, 
member states play the crucial role in both designing policies for governance transfer and 
applying them. Provisions are mostly made in founding treaties and protocols, which are ad-
opted by member states within the framework of their regional organizations but not through 
supranational decision-making procedures. 
Second, even when regional procedures for governance transfer are established, we do find se-
rious instances of decoupling. Especially in cases of crisis, when the democracy clause should 
be invoked by a regional organization, it is often individual member states that take the initia-
tive and engage in bilateral diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis, claiming to act on behalf of 
the regional organization but often without an explicit mandate to do so. For both SADC and 
ECOWAS, some military interventions in the 1990s were not covered by the RO’s legal basis at 
the time and rather reflected the interests of a group of members. The more recent experience 
of ECOWAS shows how increasingly precise standards and policies can be decoupled from ac-
tual practice: In cases where military interventions appear costly or unpopular, heads of state 
might decide against them (or rely on others), regardless of the regional provisions (Hartmann 
forthcoming). At the same time, regional actors might be held back by member states that per-
ceive them as too “activist,” as illustrated by the SADC Court’s suspension (van der Vleuten/
Hulse forthcoming).
Finally, the issue is not only whether the governance transfer by regional organizations is 
effective in changing the governance institutions of their members, making them more le-
gitimate. Whether or not they succeed, the governance transfer by a regional organization can 
also have unintended, adverse effects. Our previous research has shown, for example, that the 
EU’s promotion of good governance in neighboring countries tends to stabilize rather than 
transform semi-authoritarian regimes (Börzel/Pamuk 2012; Börzel/van Hüllen 2011). More-
over, regional organizations can also shield their members against governance transfer by 
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other external actors, for example by establishing their own election observation missions or 
their own human rights courts. 
As this paper has demonstrated, governments around the globe increasingly feel compelled to 
deal with questions of legitimate governance in the framework of a growing number of region-
al organizations. This development warrants further investigation into the reasons for and 
the impact of governance transfer by regional organizations. Do governments resort to the 
regional level in order to address problems caused by limited statehood within their own ter-
ritory or their neighbors? And to what extent does governance transfer by regional and other 
external actors support the capacities of governance institutions in areas of limited statehood 
to provide collective goods or regulate their provision in an effective and legitimate way?
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Annex 1: Important documents for governance transfer
Regional 
Organization
Document Concepts covered
Dem. HR GG RoL
AU 1963 OAU Charter 
1981 Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
1990 African Charter on the Rights … of the Child
2000 Lomé Declar. on Unconst. Change of Gov.
2000 Constitutive Act of the AU
2002 NEPAD Decl. on Democracy and Governance
2002 Principles Governing Democratic Elections
2002 Protocol on the Establishment of the PSC
2003 Convention on … Combating Corruption
2003 Protocol … on the Rights of Women
2006 African Youth Charter
2007 Charter on Democracy, Elections, Gov.
2008 Protocol on the Statute of the ACJHR
2011 Charter on Values … of Public Service
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
ECOWAS 1979 Protocol Relating to Free Movement
1991 Declaration of Political Principles
1993 Revised ECOWAS Treaty
1999 Prot. on Mechanism for Conflict Prevention
2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Gov.
2001 Protocol on the Fight Against Corruption
2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
SADC 1992 Treaty of the SADC
1997 Code on HIV/AIDS and Employment
1997 Declaration on Gender and Development
1999 Gender Plan of Action
2001 Framework Activities for Gender
2001 Agreement Amending the Treaty
2001 Protocol on Politics, Defense and Sec. Coop.
2001 Protocol Against Corruption
2003 Indicative Strategy Development Plan
2003 Charter of Fundamental Social Rights
2003 Maseru Declaration on HIV/AIDS
2004 Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ
2004 Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections
2007 Code on Social Security
2008 Protocol on Gender and Development
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
 
X
X
X
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OAS 1948 Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Men
1948 OAS Charter
1969 Convention on Human Rights
1985 Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture
1988 Protocol on Econ., Social, Cultural Rights
1990 Protocol to Abolish the Death Penalty
1991 Santiago Resolution / Res. 1080
1992 Washington Protocol (Charter revision)
1994 Convention on Forced Disappearances
1994 Convention on Violence against Women
1996 Convention against Corruption
1999 Convention on People with Disabilities
2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter
2001 Mechanism for … Implement. of the IACAC
2005 Program for Democratic Governance
2006 Program for Coop. … against Corruption
2008: Right to Freedom of Thought and Express.
2008: Principles on … Persons Deprived of Liberty
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Mercosur 1992 Political Declaration
1998 Protocol of Ushuaia
1998 Social and Employment Declaration
2004 CMC Decision 24/04
2005 Protocol of Asunción on Human Rights
2005 Constitutive Protocol of MS Parliament
2006 CMC Decision 24/06
2007 CMC Decision 05/07
2010 CMC Decisions 28/10, 64/10
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
CAN 1980 Carta de Riobamba
1995 Presidential evaluation
1999 Decision 458
2000 Andean Comm. Commitment to Democracy
2001 Act of Carabobo
2001 Declaration of Machu Picchu
2002 Andean Human Rights Charter
2007 Dec. 668 / Plan to Fight against Corruption
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
x
X
X
X
X
X
X
NAFTA 1994 Agreement on Labor Cooperation
1994 Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
X
X
X
X
X
X
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ASEAN 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord
1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
1993 Communiqué of 26th Ministerial Meeting
1997 ASEAN Vision 2020
2003 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II
2003 Declaration on … Violence Against Women
2004 Declaration against Trafficking in Persons
2007 ASEAN Charter
2007 Declaration on Rights of Migrant Workers
2009 Cha-Am Hua Hin Declaration
2009 Cha-Am Hua Hin Roadmap 2009 to 2015
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
LAS 2004 Tunis Decl. on Reform and Modernization
2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights
2010 Arab Convention to Fight Corruption
X X
X
X
X
X
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